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Abstract
The probabilistic guarded-command language (pGCL) contains both demonic and probabilis-
tic non-determinism, which makes it suitable for reasoning about distributed random algorithms.
Proofs are based on weakest precondition semantics, using an underlying logic of real- (rather than
Boolean-)valued functions.
We present a mechanization of the quantitative logic for pGCL using the HOL theorem prover,
including a proof that all pGCL commands satisfy the new condition sublinearity, the quantitative
generalization of conjunctivity for standard GCL.
The mechanized theory also supports the creation of an automatic proof tool which takes as input
an annotated pGCL program and its partial correctness speciﬁcation, and derives from that a sufﬁcient
set of veriﬁcation conditions. This is employed to verify the partial correctness of the probabilistic
voting stage in Rabin’s mutual-exclusion algorithm.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The probabilistic guarded-command language (pGCL) extends Dijkstra’s original
guarded-command language (GCL) [1] to include probabilistic choice [15]. The extension
allows the speciﬁcation of quantitative properties of programs, such as “the chance that the
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program delivers the correct output is at least 0.95.” Demonic non-determinism, identiﬁed
by Dijkstra as the key notion underlying abstraction and reﬁnement, is retained. Within
pGCL the combination of probability and non-determinism allows the realistic treatment of
imprecise behaviour, avoiding the problem that exact probabilities cannot be implemented.
For instance a program that behaves correctly (indicated by an ok result) with probability
at least 0.95 can be described in pGCL as
ok 0.95⊕ (¬ok  ok).
Here, 0.95⊕ represents a probabilistic choice of (0.95, 0.05) between its left, right argu-
ments, respectively; the  on the other hand represents demonic choice, thought of as a
selection made arbitrarily. This combination of probabilistic and demonic choices means
that programs can exhibit a range of behaviours, rather than exactly one: above, the “de-
mon” can affect the outcome only 5% of the time, and then might behave correctly in any
case. The most that can be said is that the probability that the output will be ok lies in the
interval between 95% and 100%. 1
We describe the quantitative properties of probabilistic programs using pGCL’s quan-
titative program logic [16]. Programs are interpreted as real- rather than Boolean-valued
functions of the state, and it is this generality which admits sound judgements concerning
probabilistic and demonic choices, as above.
In this paper, we present the following signiﬁcant novelties:
• A mechanization of pGCL programs (with weakest-precondition semantics) in higher-
order logic, using the HOL4 theorem prover [3]:
• An automatic proof tool that takes as input annotated pGCL programs, and calculates
veriﬁcation conditions sufﬁcient for their partial correctness; and
• The application of this proof tool to the formal veriﬁcation of the probabilistic voting
scheme in Rabin’s mutual-exclusion algorithm [10].
Amechanized theory is one with a machine-readable logical formalization; and there are
two main beneﬁts to having a mechanized theory for pGCL. The ﬁrst is the existence of
a logical formalization at all: if the theory is formalized in a consistent logic by making
deﬁnitions and then deriving consequences of them (instead of simply asserting axioms),
then the theory has a strong assurance of consistency. The HOL4 theorem prover provides
tool support for this “deﬁnitional approach,” and as a result our pGCL theories are as
consistent as the base higher-order logic.
The second beneﬁt of mechanization is machine-readability: we can use the mechanized
pGCL theories to support the creation of automatic proof tools that useweakest-precondition
semantics for reasoning. For example, verifying pGCL programs typically involves much
numerical calculation, and this can be formally carried out by rewriting with relevant the-
orems about real numbers. Since HOL4 is a theorem prover in the LCF family, it provides
a full programming language (ML) for the user to write such tools [4]. Consistency is en-
forced by the logical kernel, a small module that is solely empowered to create objects of
type theorem, which it does by applying the inference rules of higher-order logic.
1 Another approach to the semantics of probabilistic programs [8] leaves out demonic non-determinism and
instead takes these probability intervals as primitive.
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We created many small tools to speed up mechanization and program veriﬁcation, in-
cluding the rewriting described above for real numbers. We also implemented a tool which
takes as input an annotated program C, precondition P and postcondition Q, and generates
veriﬁcation conditions that are sufﬁcient for partial correctness (the Hoare triple {P }C{Q}).
It proves as many of these veriﬁcation conditions as it can, simpliﬁes the remainder and
then returns them to the user as subgoals to be proved interactively.
Finally, we apply the theory and proof tools to the formal veriﬁcation of the probabilis-
tic module of Rabin’s mutual-exclusion algorithm. This uses probability as a symmetry-
breaking mechanism to elect a leader, and it is speciﬁed as having at least a 23 chance of
electing a unique leader, independent of the number of processors. We formally verify a
sequential version of the algorithm, that is a data reﬁnement of the original, establishing
that if the algorithm terminates then the 23 lower bound holds.
In Section 2, we present the formalization of pGCL in higher-order logic, illustrated with
a simple worked example: the Monty Hall game. In Section 3, we describe the proof tool
for generating veriﬁcation conditions; and in Section 4, we apply the theory and tools to
the veriﬁcation of the probabilistic voting scheme in Rabin’s mutual-exclusion algorithm.
1.1. Notation
Higher-order logic types include the Booleans B, reals R, and integers Z. The notation
t : means that the term t has type . Applying the function f to an argument x is expressed
by juxtaposition f x, andmultiplication uses an explicit operator× instead of juxtaposition.
We use the notation x ≡ t to mean x is deﬁned to be t. Finally, we use the variable e to
range over real-valued expressions denoting random variables over the state, t to range over
transformers, s to range over states and c to range over commands.
2. Formalized pGCL
Fix a (possibly inﬁnite) state space  and let  be the probability subdistributions over ,
that is functions f : → [0, 1] such that∑x∈ f x1.
We can then view a probabilistic command c as a relation  ×  → B between initial
states and probability subdistributions over ﬁnal states. This is a relational (or operational)
semantics: a program evolves from a deﬁnite initial state yet produces not a deﬁnite ﬁnal
state, but rather a probability distribution over ﬁnal states that reﬂects the probabilistic
branching in its execution. Demonic branching is indicated by relating the initial state to
more than one ﬁnal distribution. The following example shows both why we need relations
instead of functions, and probability sub-distributions.
Example 1. Consider the following probabilistic program
Ex1 ≡ (n := n+1  n := n+2) 1/2⊕ Abort,
where  denotes demonic choice, 1/2⊕ denotes symmetric probabilistic choice and Abort
means “go into an inﬁnite loop” (see Section 2.2 for precise deﬁnitions). The state space of
Ex1 is Z (the possible values of the program variable n); and applying the above semantics
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to Ex1 gives a relation that relates initial state n = 0 to these two subdistributions over ﬁnal
states:
(· · · , −1 → 0.0, 0 → 0.0, 1 → 0.5, 2 → 0.0, 3 → 0.0, 4 → 0.0, · · ·)
(· · · , −1 → 0.0, 0 → 0.0, 1 → 0.0, 2 → 0.5, 3 → 0.0, 4 → 0.0, · · ·)
The logic for pGCL has this relational semantics as a model: it is a quantitative weakest-
precondition formulation originally due to Kozen [9], but with demonic choice added [16].
A program’s ﬁnal distributions are described by giving their expected values with respect
to arbitrary random variables which we think of as “reward functions” that quantify the
beneﬁt of successful termination. The effect of this approach is to simplify the resulting
proof system, without conceding expressivity [14].
Given a probabilistic command c, ﬁx a reward function Q:  → R+ from ﬁnal states
to non-negative real numbers. Given an initial state x we can compute the average reward
from executing c repeatedly by taking the expected value of random variableQwith respect
to c’s output distribution. If c is also demonic, we average over all distributions separately
and take the least result (because adversaries act to minimize expected rewards). Lastly, if
c does not terminate the convention is to reward with zero.
Using this procedure, we can calculate the expected reward for each initial state x, and
thus end up with a reward function P :  → R+ from initial states to non-negative real
numbers: the weakest precondition of Q.
Example 2. Consider again the probabilistic programEx1, and suppose the reward function
Q on ﬁnal states is deﬁned as
Qn ≡ “2 if n is odd, and 3 if n is even.”
What is the expected reward function P on an initial state x? Half the time the program will
loop and the rewardwill be zero. The remaining half of the time the least expected value over
the demon’s choice will be due to whichever assignment delivers an odd result, because
the reward is only 2 for this, as opposed to 3 for the even outcome. Thus, the expected
reward is
P x ≡ 1/2× 0+ 1/2× 2,
that is one, for every initial state x.
Expected-reward functions such as P and reward functions such as Q are simply called
expectations. In pGCL, we view a probabilistic command c as an expectation transformer,
mapping expectations on ﬁnal states to expectations on the initial states. It is an elementary
fact of probability theory that if the post-expectation is derived from a predicate—a charac-
teristic function that rewards one for states satisfying the predicate and zero otherwise—then
the pre-expectation gives the greatest guaranteed probability that the program terminates in
a state satisfying the predicate.
We spend the remainder of this section presenting a formalization of this weakest
precondition-style semantics of probabilistic programs.
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2.1. Formalizing expectation transformers
In pGCL, expectations are functions from a state space  to the extended positive real
numbers R+ ≡ [0,+∞]. The real numbers have previously been mechanized in sev-
eral different theorem provers (for an example in Ergo see [18]), so we have a solid
basis on which to construct extended positive real numbers. Accordingly, we ﬁrst cre-
ated a new higher-order logic-type posreal to capture this domain, and lifted the usual
arithmetic operations to it. Naturally, we had to make some choices about how the lifted
arithmetic operations should behave on ∞, and the following identities summarize our
decisions:
1/0 = ∞ 1/∞ = 0 ∀ x.∞+ x = ∞
∀ x. x = ∞ ⇒∞− x = ∞ ∀ x. x = ∞ ⇒ x −∞ = 0
∀ x. 0× x = 0 ∀ x. x = 0 ⇒∞× x = ∞.
Both addition and multiplication are deﬁned to be commutative, so the above rules tell us
that ∀x. x × 0 = 0, for example. Also, division is deﬁned in terms of multiplication and
reciprocal, so from the above we can infer that∞/∞ = 0. In fact, the only operation not
covered by the above rules is∞−∞, which we deliberately leave unspeciﬁed. 2
To support our later development we deﬁne min and max operations on posreal, and a
useful shorthand to enforce one-boundedness: [x]1 ≡ min x 1.
We also prove a collection of theorems that can be used as rewrites to perform numer-
ical calculations on elements of posreal, reducing the burden on the user in interactive
proof.
Example 3. The posreal calculations
 (1/3− 1/5)× 6 = 4/5
and
∞− 53 = ∞
can be automatically carried out by the HOL4 simpliﬁer.
Now, we have deﬁned the type of positive real numbers, we focus our attention on the
type
()expect ≡ → posreal,
of expectations on the state space . Note that  is a type variable, able to be instantiated to
any higher-order logic type, and therefore the theorems that we prove about expectations do
not assume any properties of the state space. 3 We deﬁne several operations on expectations,
2 In higher-order logic every function must be total, so∞−∞ must be some element x of posreal, but there is
no theorem that gives any information about x.
3 In particular, the state space might be inﬁnite.
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which are just pointwise liftings of the corresponding operations on positive reals:
Zero ≡ s. 0
Infty ≡ s.∞
e1  e2 ≡ ∀ s. e1 se2 s
Min e1 e2 ≡ s. min (e1 s) (e2 s)
Max e1 e2 ≡ s. max (e1 s) (e2 s)
Cond b e1 e2 ≡ s. if b s then e1 s else e2 s
Lin p e1 e2 ≡ s. let x ← [p s]1 in x × e1 s + (1− x)× e2 s.
The type ()expect forms a complete lattice, with Min and Max being the meet and join
operators, and Zero and Infty being the bottom and top elements. Whereas the Zero expec-
tation assigns every state a value of zero, the Infty expectation assigns every state a value
of∞.
Finally, the Lin operation constructs the linear interpolation between two expectations,
and Cond switches between two expectations according to a predicate on the state space.
In pGCL, the semantics of a probabilistic program is an expectation transformer map-
ping postconditions on ﬁnal states to weakest preconditions on initial states. Expectation
transformers thus have higher-order logic type
()transformer ≡ ()expect→ ()expect.
To reason about expectation transformers, we borrow a few standard concepts from lattice
theory, in particular the existence of least and greatest ﬁxed points of monotonic transform-
ers, which we refer to, respectively, as expect_lfp and expect_gfp.
Formalizingwhat it means to be a least or greatest ﬁxed point of a expectation transformer
is an easy matter:
lfp t e ≡ (t e = e) ∧ ∀e′. t e′  e′ ⇒ e  e′,
gfp t e ≡ (t e = e) ∧ ∀e′. e′  t e′ ⇒ e′  e.
The deﬁnitions of expect_lfp and expect_gfp use Hilbert’s -operator 4 to pick any expec-
tation that is a ﬁxed point:
expect_lfp t ≡ e. lfp t e, expect_gfp t ≡ e. gfp t e.
Of course, such a deﬁnition is only useful if we can prove that there exist ﬁxed points
for a particular expectation transformer. That is why we also formalize the Knaster–Tarski
theorem for lattices, which guarantees the existence of least and greatest ﬁxed points for
monotonic, up-continuous expectation transformers. Since these lattice theory concepts are
referred to later in the deﬁnition of healthy transformers, for completeness we list here the
formalized deﬁnitions:
monotonic t ≡ ∀e1, e2. e1  e2 ⇒ t e1  t e2,
lub S e ≡ (∀e′ ∈ S. e′  e) ∧ ∀e1. (∀e′ ∈ S. e′  e1)⇒ e  e1,
chain C ≡ ∀e1, e2 ∈ C. e1  e2 ∨ e2  e1,
up_continuous t ≡ ∀C, e. chain C ∧ lub C e ⇒ lub {y | ∃z ∈ C. y = t z} (t e).
4 Hilbert’s -operator is a form of the axiom of choice: the term x. (x) is equal to some element that satisﬁes
, or some element of the type if nothing satisﬁes .
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2.2. Formalizing the weakest-precondition semantics
Next, we deﬁne the pGCL semantics of a simple programming language. For concrete-
ness, we begin by deﬁning a state space, state ≡ string → Z, representing a map from
variable names to integer values. The following deﬁnition creates a new state from an old
state by making a variable assignment of f s to v:
assign v f s ≡ w. if w = v then f s else s w
Next, we deﬁne a new higher-order datatype for pGCL commands:
command ≡ Abort
| Skip
| Assign of string× (state→ Z)
| Seq of command× command
| Demon of command× command
| Prob of (state→ posreal)× command× command
| While of (state→ B)× command.
The Abort command represents non-termination of the program; in a technical sense it is
“the worst possible program.” The next three command are completely standard: the Skip
command does nothing; Assign v f evaluates f on the current state and assigns the result
to variable v; and the Seq c1 c2 command is sequential composition, executing ﬁrst c1 and
then c2.
The Demon command uses demonic choice to decide which of the two argument com-
mands to execute, and the Prob command uses probabilistic choice. Since the probability
argument of Prob is a function state→ posreal, the choice probability is explicitly allowed
to depend on the state.
Finally, theWhile c b is a loop command that tests whether the state satisﬁes condition c:
if so, the body b is executed and the loop is repeated, otherwise the command does nothing.
When writing commands, we enhance the readability with the following syntactic sugar:
v := f ≡ Assign v f,
c1; c2 ≡ Seq c1 c2,
c1  c2 ≡ Demon c1 c2,
c1 p⊕ c2 ≡ Prob (s. p) c1 c2,
If b c1 c2 ≡ Prob (s. if b s then 1 else 0) c1 c2,
v := {e1, . . . , en} ≡ v := e1  · · ·  v := en,
v := 〈e1, . . . , en〉 ≡ v := e1 1/n⊕ v := 〈e2, . . . , en〉,
b1 → c1 | · · · | bn → cn
≡
{
Abort if none of the bi holds (on the current state)
i∈I ci where I ≡ {i | 1 in ∧ bi holds}.
In addition,we routinely suppressmention of the state in expressions and conditions, writing
for example v := n+ 1 instead of v := s. s n+ 1.
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We now deﬁne the weakest precondition semantic operator wp, which is a higher-order
logic function of type command → (state)transformer and maps commands to their se-
mantic meaning as expectation transformers:
 (wp Abort = e. Zero)
∧ (wp Skip = e. e)
∧ (wp (Assign v f ) = e, s. e (assign v f s))
∧ (wp (Seq c1 c2) = e. wp c1 (wp c2 e))
∧ (wp (Demon c1 c2) = e.Min (wp c1 e) (wp c2 e))
∧ (wp (Prob p c1 c2) = e. Lin p (wp c1 e) (wp c2 e))
∧ (wp (While b c) = e. expect_lfp (e′. Cond b (wp c e′) e)).
Example 4. In this example, the desired ﬁnal state is one in which the variables i and j
have the same value, and so we use the postcondition
post ≡ if i = j then 1 else 0.
First, consider the program
pd ≡ i := 〈0, 1〉; j := {0, 1}.
The intuitive reading of pd is that the variable i is ﬁrst set to either 0 or 1 by tossing a fair
coin, and then the demon sets variable j to either 0 or 1. With this interpretation, it is no
surprise that we can never beat the demon, and indeed we can prove that in the weakest
precondition every initial state is mapped to zero:
 wp pd post = Zero.
Next, consider the program
dp ≡ j := {0, 1}; i := 〈0, 1〉,
which does the assignments the other way around. First, the demon must set variable j, and
then variable i is set using the fair coin. In this case, we can prove
 wp dp post = s. 1/2,
which corresponds to our intuition that the demon does not know the outcome of the fair
coin before it is tossed, and therefore can be beaten half the time on average.
2.3. Healthiness conditions
For standardGCL, Dijkstra introduced several “healthiness conditions” that characterize
exactly the predicate transformers that correspond formally to an equivalent operational
(relational) semantics of programs [1]; the conditions are used to derive sound proof rules
for veriﬁcation. Likewise, there is a correspondence between the expectation-transformer
semantics of probabilistic programs and the operational interpretation of probabilistic
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programs—in fact an expectation transformer is healthy if it is feasible, up_continuous
and sublinear [16], where up_continuous is a property of lattice theory and
feasible t ≡ t Zero = Zero,
scaling t ≡ ∀ e, x. t (s. x × e s) = s. x × t e s,
subadditive t ≡ ∀ e1, e2. t (s. e1 s + e2 s)  s. t e1 s + t e2 s,
subtractive t ≡ ∀ e, x. c = ∞ ⇒ s. t e s − x  t (s. e s − x),
sublinear t ≡ scaling t ∧ subadditive t ∧ subtractive t.
Feasibility is an intuitive property, corresponding toDijkstra’s Law of the ExcludedMiracle:
if the value of all ﬁnal states is zero, then so must be the value of all the initial states.
Sublinearity in pGCL is the generalization of the conjunctivity healthiness condition in
standard GCL, and is in fact equivalent to the single formula
sublinear t
≡ ∀ e1, e2, x1, x2, x.
(s. x1 × t e1 s + x2 × t e2 s − x)  t (s. x1 × e1 s + x2 × e2 s − x).
Our present formalization does not include the proofs that connect expectation transformers
with the relational semantics (which was ﬁrst demonstrated by Morgan et al. [16]). Instead,
we simply deﬁne a predicate
healthy t ≡ feasible t ∧ up_continuous t ∧ sublinear t
and restrict our attention to healthy transformers. The propertiesmonotonic, scaling, linear,
subtractive are all logical consequences of healthy, as we check in the theorem prover.
As a point of interest, in ﬁnite state spaces the property up_continuous follows from
feasible and sublinear, but in inﬁnite state spaces this is no longer the case. By instantiating
the state space to Z and using the transformer e, s. infn{e n} as a witness, it is possible to
formally prove
 ∃ t. feasible t ∧ sublinear t ∧ ¬up_continuous t.
The main theorem of our formalization looks deceptively simple:
 ∀c. healthy (wp c).
It states that applying the weakest precondition semantic operator wp to any command
yields a healthy transformer.
Our direct proof is a structural induction on the command, and required 800 lines of
HOL4 proof script for the main proof. (Dijkstra similarly used structural induction for the
corresponding GCL proof.) The hardest part was proving sublinearity of while loops; for
that we needed several lemmas, such as the monotonicity of expect_lfp and that subtraction
subdistributes through healthy transformers.
However, the importance of healthiness conditions cannot be overstated: for instance,
properties like these are what we use to deduce the simplifying rules for the veriﬁcation
calculator described below.
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2.4. TheMonty Hall game
An example is provided by the infamousMonty Hall game, where the role of the demon
is played by the game show host. 5 There are three curtains and the contestant hopes to
win a prize by guessing the curtain where it is hidden. The game begins with the demon
choosing a prize curtain pc behind which to hide the prize. Next, the contestant chooses a
curtain cc uniformly at random. The demon then chooses an alternative curtain ac that is
not equal to either of pc and cc, and opens it. At this point, the contestant may either stick
with his original choice of curtain, or switch to the remaining closed curtain. Should the
contestant switch?
We code up the Monty Hall contestant with the following deﬁnition:
contestant switch ≡
pc := {1, 2, 3};
cc := 〈1, 2, 3〉;
pc = 1 ∧ cc = 1 → ac := 1
| pc = 2 ∧ cc = 2 → ac := 2
| pc = 3 ∧ cc = 3 → ac := 3;
if ¬switch then Skip else
cc := (if cc = 1 ∧ ac = 1 then 1 else if cc = 2 ∧ ac = 2 then 2 else 3)
The left-hand side of the deﬁnition includes switch as a parameter of the contestant; this is
used in the program on the right-hand side to determine whether to switch curtain in the
last step. The postcondition is the desired goal of the contestant, i.e.,
win ≡ if cc = pc then 1 else 0.
This example is small enough that we can verify it directly in HOL4 simply by rewriting
away all the syntactic sugar, expanding the deﬁnition of wp and carrying out the numerical
calculations. This has the effect of pushing the postcondition back to the start of the program,
something that is not trivial to do by hand because the formulae become quite large. After
22 s and 250,536 primitive inferences in the logical kernel, the veriﬁcation succeeds with
the following theorem:
 wp (contestant switch) win = s. if switch then 2/3 else 1/3.
In other words, by switching the contestant is twice as likely to win the prize.
3. A veriﬁcation-condition generator
In general, programs are shown to have desirable properties by proving lower bounds—
for example, a program Prog can be shown to behave correctly with probability at least 0.95
5Monty Hall was host of the game show Let’s Make a Deal from 1963 to 1976; ironically this game show was
notable for requiring absolutely no skill or intelligence from its contestants.
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by proving the inequality
 (s. 0.95)  wp Prog (if ok then 1 else 0),
where the post-expectation encodes the characteristic function of the set of states in which
some Boolean ok holds. Of course, if a stronger guarantee is required (a 0.99 level of
conﬁdence, for example) then a stronger theorem would be required to establish it. In this
section, we show how to mechanize the proof of such lower bounds; in fact, we concentrate
on a generalization of the weakest liberal precondition semantics, a useful weakening of
weakest precondition semantics. 6
3.1. Weakest-liberal-precondition semantics
The weakest-liberal-precondition operator wlp is the partial correctness analogue of wp.
Focussing on wlp and partial correctness greatly simpliﬁes formal veriﬁcation of looping
programs, since the wp least ﬁxed-point semantics are “the wrong way around” for proving
lower bounds on preconditions.
In fact, the usual technique for proving total correctness for loops in pGCL is ﬁrst to
prove partial correctness, and then to show that wp and wlp agree on the while loop—this
amounts to proving that the loop terminates with probability 1. This is the pGCL analogue
of the well-known rule
total correctness = partial correctness+ proof of termination
and has been proved elsewhere for pGCL [12]. Moreover, simple techniques based
on program variants have also been derived. However, for the remainder of this paper
we will be solely interested in partial correctness, and so questions of termination will not
concern us.
For partial correctness, if a program does not terminate then it satisﬁes every postcondi-
tion. Since the only placeswhere a programmaydiverge are theAbort andWhile commands,
the weakest-liberal-precondition semantic operator wlp differs from wp only on those two
commands: they have semantics, respectively
wlp Abort ≡ e. Infty,
and
wlp (While b c) ≡ e. expect_gfp (e′. Cond b (wlp c e′) e).
The full HOL formalization is based on the partial correctness theory for pGCL [12]. 7
We cannot expect wlp to produce healthy transformers like wp, since the fact that
wlp Abort Zero = Infty trivially breaks feasibility, but wlp transformers are at least
monotonic:
 ∀c, e1, e2. e1  e2 ⇒ wlp c e1  wlp c e2.
6 In fact, for terminating programs there is no weakening.
7 In fact, only the wlp veriﬁcation conditions (proved in Section 3.2) are important here, and the most crucial
of these—monotonicity—is satisﬁed by both our formalization of wlp and McIver and Morgan’s [12].
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This is a useful sanity check, and means that (because of the lattice theory) the greatest
ﬁxed point in the wlp semantics of theWhile command is always well-deﬁned.
Example 5. We illustrate the difference between wp and wlp semantics on the simplest
inﬁnite loop: loop ≡While (s. ") Skip.
For any postcondition post:  wp loop post = Zero and  wlp loop post = Infty.
These correspond to the Hoare triples [⊥] loop [post] and {"} loop {post}, just what we
would expect from an inﬁnite loop.
3.2. wlp veriﬁcation conditions
In this section, we assume that we have a pGCL command c and a postcondition q, and
we wish to derive a lower bound on the weakest-liberal precondition. If we think of this as
the ﬁrst-order query P  wlp c q, then we can use the following theorems together with a
Prolog interpreter to solve for the variable P.
 Infty  wlp Abort Q
 Q  wlp Skip Q
 (Q ◦ assign V F)  wlp (Assign V F) Q
 R  wlp C2 Q ∧ P  wlp C1 R ⇒ P  wlp (Seq C1 C2) Q
 P1  wlp C1 Q ∧ P2  wlp C2 Q ⇒ Min P1 P2  wlp (Demon C1 C2) Q
 P1  wlp C1 Q ∧ P2  wlp C2 Q ⇒ Lin P P1 P2  wlp (Prob P C1 C2) Q
 P1  wlp C1 Q ∧ P2  wlp C2 Q ⇒ Cond B P1 P2  wlp (If B C1 C2) Q
The advantage of propagating conditions backward (implemented here with a Prolog inter-
preter) is that unnecessary annotations can be avoided. For example, consider the sequence
wlp (Seq c1 c2) q. There is no need for an annotation between the two commands, because
the Prolog interpreter uses the rules to solve for a lower-bound r onwlp c2 q, then solves for
a lower-bound p on wlp c1 r , and then returns p as a lower bound on the whole command
wlp (Seq c1 c2) q.
However, annotations are required to deploy the following theorem about while loops:
 ∀P,Q, b, c. P  Cond b (wlp c P ) Q ⇒ P  wlp (While b c) Q.
To insert annotations, we deﬁne an assertion command that simply ignores the formula
given as its ﬁrst argument: thus Assert p c ≡ c. This is the precise rule we give to the
Prolog interpreter:
 R  wlp c P ∧ P  Cond b R Q ⇒ P  wlp (Assert P (While b c)) Q.
It is therefore left to the user to provide a useful loop invariant P in the Assert around
the while loop. Note that the Prolog tactic will succeed on the ﬁrst subgoal, deriving a
lower bound for the body of the while loop, but the second subgoal will fail because there
are no applicable rules. In our tactic failed subgoals do not initiate backtracking, but are
instead turned into veriﬁcation conditions. Therefore, in this way each while loop in the
program will generate one veriﬁcation condition, in this case that the supplied P is in fact a
correct invariant for establishing Q. Nested while loops work in exactly the same way: the
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invariant for the outer loop will be propagated backwards through the body, and when it
meets the inner while loop a veriﬁcation condition will be generated. It is usually impossible
to calculate the precise loop invariant, but the fact that the ability to provide a weaker loop
invariant that still satisﬁes the speciﬁcation turns out to be a effective strategy.
Note that the rule for while loops is the only one where the presence of the  predicate
is necessary. In each of the rules for the other commands, all occurrences of  could be
replaced by= and the result would still be a valid rule. The reason that the is necessary in
the rule for while loops is because of the user-provided loop invariant. If the loop invariant
provided was known to be the strongest possible, then every occurrence of  could be
replaced by = and the tool would calculate the exact value of wlp. This is exactly the
approach taken in model checking.
The full wlp tactic works as follows:
(1) Take as input a goal of the form p  wlp c q.
(2) Expand any syntactic sugar in c.
(3) Create the query X  wlp c q and pass to the Prolog interpreter.
(4) The result will be a theorem

∧
1 in
Vi ⇒ r  wlp c q,
where the Vi are veriﬁcation conditions.
(5) Apply transitivity of to reduce the initial goal to the subgoals p  r and r  wlp c q.
(6) Use the theorem returned by Prolog to reduce the subgoal r  wlp c q to the subgoals
V1, . . . , Vn.
(7) Expand all the subgoals with the deﬁnitions of ,Min, Lin and Cond.
(8) Try to prove all the subgoals by simplifying them and carrying out any numerical
calculations.
(9) Return all unproved subgoals to the user, to prove interactively.
Returning to the example of theMonty Hall game, we can apply the wlp tactic to prove the
following partial correctness theorem completely automatically:
 (s. if switch then 2/3 else 1/3)  wlp (contestant switch) win.
Since there are no while loops in the contestant program, there were no veriﬁcation con-
ditions, and the only non-trivial subgoal was the p  r generated in Step 5 of the tactic.
However, this was proved automatically by the simpliﬁcation and calculation in Step 8, and
so no subgoals were returned to the user.
This automatic veriﬁcation of the Monty Hall game is obviously much less effort than
the interactive proof version described in Section 2.4 which took 18 lines of HOL4 proof
script, but the automatic version of the theorem is weaker: it only shows partial correctness.
4. Example: Rabin’s mutual-exclusion algorithm
Suppose N processors are concurrently executing, and from time to time some of
them need to access a critical section of code. Rabin’s mutual-exclusion algorithm uses a
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probabilistic voting scheme to elect a unique “leader processor” that is permitted to enter
the critical section [10].
The idea behind the voting scheme is beautifully simple: each processor tosses a fair coin
until the ﬁrst head is shown, 8 and the processor that required the largest number of tosses
wins the election.
Example 6. The following pGCL program sets the variable n according to the desired
distribution:
n := 0; b := 0;While (b = 0) (n := n+ 1; b := 〈0, 1〉).
In our veriﬁcation, we do not model i processors concurrently executing the above voting
scheme, but rather the equivalent formulation of that system used by Rabin [10]:
(1) Initialize i with the number of processors competing for exclusive access to the critical
section.
(2) If i = 1 then we have a unique winner: return SUCCESS.
(3) If i = 0 then the election has failed: return FAILURE.
(4) Toss the coins: since each toss of a fair coin produces a head with probability 12 , each
processor retires with that probability. We reduce i by eliminating all these processors,
since certainly none of them won the election.
(5) Return to Step (2).
The following pGCL program implements this algorithm:
rabin≡While (1 < i) (
n := i;
While (0 < n)
(d := 〈0, 1〉; i := i − d; n := n− 1)
)
The desired postcondition, that there was a unique winner, is
post ≡ if i = 1 then 1 else 0.
Asurprising fact about this voting scheme is that the probability of its success is independent
of the number of processors. To prove that, we need to be able to show
pre  wlp rabin post, (1)
where pre ≡ (if i = 1 then 1 else if 1 < i then 2/3 else 0), in which the 23 does not depend
on i.
Recall the interpretation of a precondition with respect to a given postcondition. The
expression on the right at (1), evaluated at an initial state s, gives the probability that
the postcondition will be established (namely, that there is a unique winner). This must
be at least the expression on the left, which is at least 23 for all initial states except i = 0(when the satisfaction of the postcondition would be impossible in any case).
8 In other words, each processor picks an integer from a Geometric( 12 ) distribution.
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As rabin contains twoWhile loops the invariant rule must be used twice. Thus, two loop
invariants are needed, one for the inner, and one for the outer loop, and the most challenging
part of the veriﬁcation turned out to be ﬁnding them (of course). The correct invariant for
the outer loop is simply pre above, but for the inner loop we used
if 0n i then (2/3)× invar1 i n+ invar2 i n else 0,
where
invar1 i n≡ 1− (if i = n then (n+ 1)/2n else if i = n+ 1 then 1/2n else 0),
invar2 i n≡ if i = n then n/2n else if i = n+ 1 then 1/2n else 0.
Translating very roughly into English: invar1 corresponds to the probability that the inner
loop terminates with i > 1; and invar2 to the probability that the inner loop terminates with
i = 1. Therefore, the probability p that the outer loop will terminate with i = 1 satisﬁes
p = p× invar1+ invar2, and we are proving that the voting algorithm works with p = 23 .
To deploy the wlp tactic, an equivalent annotated version of the program is required,
constructed by using Assert to annotate rabinwith the above invariants. Next, the wlp tactic
is applied to the annotated program, and three subgoals are produced (one as usual, plus two
veriﬁcation conditions generated by the while loops). The wlp tactic proves one of these
automatically, and simpliﬁes the other two. We apply some custom simpliﬁcations, and are
left with three non-trivial subgoals which depend on properties of exponentials. These are
despatched by 58 lines of proof script, completing the veriﬁcation of the speciﬁcation (1)
of the behaviour of rabin.
5. Conclusions and future work
Wehave shown how to formalize in higher-order logic the theory of pGCL, a language for
reasoning about both demonic and probabilistic choice in a common framework; we have
implemented a veriﬁcation-condition generator to assist with formally proving the partial
correctness of programs, and we have demonstrated it on some small examples.
In addition to mechanizing a direct proof that the weakest precondition semantics always
give healthy transformers, we have formalized the notion of weakest liberal preconditions
and implemented a veriﬁcation condition generator to assist with formally proving the
partial correctness of programs. Finally, we applied the theory and tools to the veriﬁcation
of the probabilistic voting scheme in Rabin’s mutual-exclusion algorithm.
This work demonstrates the beneﬁts of mechanizing a theory of program semantics
using a theorem prover. In particular, the fact that the theorem prover was interactive ﬁtted
very nicely with the veriﬁcation-condition generator: if subgoals appeared that could not be
proved automatically, then instead of causing a failure they could be passed on to the user for
manual proof.Moreoverwe took advantage of theLCF design ofHOL4,which preserves the
consistency of user-deﬁned tactics: the veriﬁcation-condition generator is highly complex,
but nevertheless any theorems that it creates have a high assurance of soundness.
Future work will focus on formalizing the correspondence between wp and wlp se-
mantics, with the aim of implementing a total-correctness veriﬁcation generator. This will
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additionally require proofs of termination, and it will be interesting to provide tool support
for probabilistic variants and other termination arguments.
6. Related work
The ﬁrst author has mechanized a semantics of probabilistic programs in HOL4 [7], but
this language did not support demonic choice. The third author has recently extended the
B tool (a proof assistant for program reﬁnement) with a probabilistic choice construct [6].
Probabilistic model checkers such as PRISM [11] effectively calculate weakest precon-
ditions for ﬁnite-state machines incorporating both probabilistic and demonic choice, and
can also deal with loops without needing helpful annotations. On the other hand, the lim-
ited expressivity of the logic means that sometimes it cannot model algorithms in their full
generality, but instead must restrict to a ﬁxed number of processors.
Harrison has previously mechanized Dijkstra’s weakest precondition semantics for stan-
dardGCL in theHOL Light theorem prover [5], and Nipkow has produced a comprehensive
mechanization of Hoare logics in the Isabelle theorem prover [17]. Finally, there have been
several veriﬁcation condition generators for while languages created for use with the HOL
theorem prover, beginning with Gordon’s in 1989 [2].
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